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ABSTRACT With the development of speech synthesis techniques, automatic speaker verification systems
face the serious challenge of spoofing attack. In order to improve the reliability of speaker verification
systems, we develop a new filter bank-based cepstral feature, deep neural network (DNN) filter bank cepstral
coefficients, to distinguish between natural and spoofed speech. The DNN filter bank is automatically
generated by training a filter bank neural network (FBNN) using natural and synthetic speech. By adding
restrictions on the training rules, the learned weight matrix of FBNN is band limited and sorted by frequency,
similar to the normal filter bank. Unlike themanually designed filter bank, the learned filter bank has different
filter shapes in different channels, which can capture the differences between natural and synthetic speech
more effectively. The experimental results on the ASVspoof 2015 database show that the Gaussian mixture
model maximum-likelihood classifier trained by the new feature performs better than the state-of-the-art
linear frequency triangle filter bank cepstral coefficients-based classifier, especially on detecting unknown
attacks.
INDEX TERMS Speaker verification, spoofing detection, DNN filter bank cepstral coefficients, filter bank
neural network.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a low-cost and flexible biometric solution to person
authentication, automatic speaker verification (ASV) has
been used in many telephone or network access control
systems, such as telephone banking [1]. Recently, with
the improvement of automatic speech generation methods,
speech produced by voice conversion (VC) [2], [3] and
speech synthesis (SS) [4], [5] techniques has been used to
attack ASV systems. Over the past few years, much research
has been devoted to protect ASV systems against spoofing
attack [6]–[8].
There are two general strategies to protect ASV systems.
One is to develop a more robust ASV system which can
resist the spoofing attack. Unfortunately, research has shown
that all the existing ASV systems are vulnerable to spoofing
attacks [9]–[13]. Verification and anti-spoofing tasks can not
be done well in only one system at the same time.
The other more popular strategy is to build a separated
spoofing detection systemwhich only focuses on distinguish-
ing between natural and synthetic speech [14]. Because of the
advantage of being easily incorporated into existing ASV sys-
tems, spoofing detection has become an important research
topic in anti-spoofing [6], [8], [10], [12], [15].
Many different acoustic features have been proposed
to improve the performance of Gaussian mixture model
maximum-likelihood (GMM-ML) based spoofing detection
systems. In [8], relative phase shift (RPS) and Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCC) were used to detect SS attacks.
A fusion system combining MFCC and group delay cepstral
coefficients (GDCC) was applied to resist VC spoofing in [1].
Paper [16] compared the spoofing detection performance of
11 different features on the ASVspoof 2015 database [17].
Among others, dynamic linear frequency triangle filter bank
cepstral coefficients (TFCC) feature performed best on
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the evaluation set and the average equal error rate was
lower than 1%.
Different from the aforementioned systems, some more
general systems using machine learning methods were devel-
oped to model the difference between natural and synthetic
speech more effectively. In [18]–[21], spoofing detection sys-
tems based on deep neural networks (DNNs) were proposed
and tested, where a DNN was used as a classifier or feature
extractor. Unfortunately, experimental results showed that,
comparedwith the acoustic feature basedGMM-ML systems,
these DNN systems performed slightly better on detecting
the trained/known spoofing methods, but much worse on
detecting unknown attacks.
In the previous studies, when a DNN was used as a feature
extractor, the output of the middle hidden layer was used
as DNN features to directly train some other types of mod-
els, e.g., Gaussian mixture model (GMM) or support vector
machine (SVM) [13], [19], [22]–[24].
If we use the short-term power spectrum as the input of a
DNN and set the activation function of first hidden layer as
‘‘linear’’, the learned weight matrix between the input layer
and the first hidden layer can be considered as a special type
of learned filter bank. The number of this hidden layer nodes
corresponds to the number of filter bank channels and each
column of the weigh matrix can be treated as the frequency
response of each filter. Unlike the conventional manually
designed filter banks, the filters of the learned filter bank have
different shapes in different channels, which can capture the
discriminative characteristic between natural and synthetic
speech more effectively. The DNN feature generated from
the first hidden layer can be treated as a kind of filter bank
feature.
Some filter bank learning methods such as LDA (Linear
discriminant analysis) filter learning [25] and log Mel-scale
filters learning [26] have been introduced in the literatures.
These methods did not restrict the shapes of learned filters
and the learned filter bank features were used on the speech
recognition task.
In this paper, we introduce a new filter bank neural
network (FBNN) by introducing some restriction on the train-
ing rules, the learned filters are non-negative, band-limited,
ordered by frequencies and have restricted shapes. The DNN
feature generated by the first hidden layer of FBNN has
the similar physical meaning of the conventional filter bank
feature and after cepstral analysis we obtain a new type of
feature, namely, deep neural network filter bank cepstral coef-
ficients (DNN-FBCC). Experimental results show that the
GMM-ML classifier based on DNN-FBCC feature outper-
forms the TFCC feature and DNN feature on the ASVspoof
2015 data base [16].
II. FILTER BANK NEURAL NETWORKS
As a hot research area, deep neural networks have been
successfully used in many speech processing tasks such as
speech recognition [27]–[29], speaker verification [30], [31]
and speech enhancement [12], [32], [33].
A trained DNN can be used for regression analysis, clas-
sification, or feature extraction. When a DNN is used as a
feature extractor, due to lack of knowledge about the specific
physical interpretation of the DNN feature, the learned fea-
ture can only be used to train some other models, directly.
Further processing, such as cepstral analysis, can not be
applied.
As one of the most classical features for speech processing,
cepstral (Cep) features , e.g., MFCC and TFCC, have been
widely used in most speech processing tasks.
FIGURE 1. The processing flow of computing cepstral features, where N ,
C , and M stand for the FFT points, the number of filter bank channels,
and the number of cepstral coefficients, respectively.
FIGURE 2. (a) A linear frequency triangular filter bank, (b) Learned filter
bank without restriction, (c) Band-limiting mask matrix sampling from (a),
(d) Learned filter bank with restriction.
Cep features can be created with the following proce-
dure shown in Fig.1. Firstly, the speech signal is segmented
into short time frames with overlapped windows. Secondly,
the power spectrum
∣∣X (ejw)∣∣2 are generated by frame-wise
N points fast Fourier transform (FFT). Thirdly, the power
spectrum is integrated using overlapping band-limited filter
bank with C channels, generating the filter bank features.
Finally, after logarithmic compression and discrete cosine
transform (DCT) on the filter bank feature, M coefficients
are selected as the Cep feature.
As shown in Fig. 2(a), a representative of commonly filters
bank used in Cep feature extraction are non-negative, band
limited, sorted by frequency and have similar shapes in dif-
ferent channels. The similar shapes for all the channels are
not suitable for the spoofing detection task because different
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FIGURE 3. The structure of filter bank neural networks.
frequency bands may play different roles in spoofing attacks.
This motivates us to use a DNNmodel to train a more flexible
and effective filter bank.
As shown in Fig. 3 we build a FBNN which includes a
linear hidden layer, a sigmoid hidden layer and a softmax
output layer. The number of nodes in the output layer is Nout ,
where the first node stands for the human voice and the other
nodes represent different spoofing attack methods. The same
as computing Cep features, we also use the power spectrum
as the input. Because the neural activation function of the first
hidden layer is a linear function, the output of the first hidden
layer can be defined as:
H1 = FWfb, (1)
where F is the input power spectrum feature with D dimen-
sion, D = 0.5N + 1. The weight matrix between the input
layer and the first hidden layer is defined as a filter bank
weight matrixWfb with dimensions D× C . C is the number
of nodes of the first hidden layer and also means the number
of channels in the learned filter bank. Each column of Wfb
can be treated as a learned filter channel.
If we do not add any restrictions in the training processing,
the learned filters will have the shapes as shown in Fig. 2.(b).
Each channel can learn a different filter shape but the char-
acteristics of a normal filter bank, such as non-negative,
band-limit and ordered by frequency, can not be satisfied.
In order to tackle this problem, we apply some restrictive
conditions onWfb as
Wfb = NR(W)Mbl, (2)
whereW ∈ RD×C ,Mbl ∈ RD×C≥0 and  means element wise
multiplication.
NR(·) is a non-negative restriction function which can
make elements ofWfb non-negative. Any monotone increas-
ing function with non-negative output can be used. We select
the sigmoid function:
NR(x) = 1/(1+ exp(−x)). (3)
Mbl is a non-negative band-limiting shape restriction mask
matrix which can restrict the filters of the learned filter bank
to have limited band, regulation shape and ordered by fre-
quency. Mbl can be generated from any band-limited filter
bank by frequency-domain sampling. Fig. 2.(c) shows a Mbl
sampling from a linear frequency triangular filter bank with
five channels (Fig. 2.(a)).
Wdc, elements of W, can be learned through stochastic
gradient descent using equations (4) - (7):
Wdc = Wdc − ηgnew, (4)
gnew = (1− m)× g+ m× gold , (5)
g =
∂L
∂H1c
∂H1c
∂Wdc
=
∂L
∂H1c
FdMbldc
∂NR(Wdc)
∂Wdc
, (6)
∂NR(Wdc)
∂Wdc
= NR(Wdc)[1− NR(Wdc)], (7)
where uppercase italic characters with subscripts mean ele-
ments of matrix and subscripts stand for indexes, d ⊆ [1,D],
c ⊆ [1,C], η is the learning rate, m is the momentum, g is
the gradient computed in backward pass, gold is the gradient
value in the previous mini-batch, and gnew is the new gradient
for the current min-batch. L is the cost function and ∂L
∂H1c
can be computed by the standard back propagation equations
for neural networks [34]. The learned filters with restrictions
are illustrated in Fig. 2.(d), which are band limited, ordered
by frequency and have different filter shapes in different
channels.
Following the cepstral analysis steps we can generate a
new kind of Cep features using the filter bank generated
from FBNN, which is defined as deep neural networks filter
bank cepstral coefficients (DNN-FBCC). The new feature can
integrate the advantages of Cep feature and the discrimination
ability of DNN model, which are specially suitable for the
task of spoofing detection.
TABLE 1. Description of ASVspoof 2015 database.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. DATABASE AND DATA PREPARATION
The performance of spoofing detection using the
DNN-FBCC feature is evaluated on the ASVspoof 2015
database [17]. As shown in TABLE 1, the database includes
three sub datasets without target speaker overlap: the training
set, the development set and the evaluation set. We used the
training set for FBNN and human/spoof classifier training.
The development set and evaluation set were used for testing.
Training set and development set are attacked by the same
five spoofing methods, where S1, S2 and S5 belong to VC
method and S3, S4 belong to SS method. Regarding the
evaluation set, besides the five known spoofing methods,
there are another five unknown methods, where S6-S9 are
VC methods and S10 is an SS method.
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The speech signals were segmented into frames with
20ms length and 10ms step size. Pre-emphasis and a hamming
window were applied on the frames before the spectrum
computation. Paper [16] showed that all the frames of speech
are useful for spoofing detection, so we did not apply any
voice activity detection method.
B. FBNN TRAINING
The FBNN described in Section II was built and trained with
computational network toolkit (CNTK) [35].
The output layer has five nodes, the first one is for human
speech and the other four are for five known spoofing meth-
ods (S3 and S4 use the same label). The number of nodes
in hidden layer H2 is set as 100, the cross entropy function
was selected as the cost function L and the training epoch
was chosen as 30. The mini-batch size was set as 128.Wwas
initialized with uniform random numbers. η and m are set as
0.1 and 0 in the first epoch, 1 and 0.9 in the other epochs.
Power spectrum of a frame withD dimension is used as input
feature, the training label is the label for the utterance that the
frame belongs to. The source code of FBNN is made publicly
available.1
Some experimental results published in paper [36]
and [16], show that the high frequency spectrum of speech is
more effective for synthetic detection. In order to investigate
the affect of different band-limiting and shape restrictions
to the learned filter banks, we use four different manually
designed filter banks to generate Mbl: the linear frequency
triangular filter bank (TFB), the linear frequency rectangular
filter bank (RFB), the equivalent rectangular band-
width (ERB) space Gammatone filter bank (GFB), and the
inverted ERB space Gammatone filter bank (IGFB).
TFB and RFB equally distribute on the whole frequency
region (Fig. 4(a), 4(c), 4(e) and 4(g)). GFB which has been
successfully used in audio recognition [37]–[39], has denser
spacing in the low-frequency region (Fig.4(i)) and IGFB gives
higher emphasis to the higher frequency region(Fig.4(k)).
When using GFB and IGFB, the filter bank number C
were set as 128, according to the suggestion of paper [39].
In order to compare with the results published in paper [16]
and evaluate the effect of filter bank channel numbers on the
learned filter banks, we set C as 20 and 128 when using
TFB and RFB. When training 20-channel filter banks, the
dimension of the input power spectrum is 257 (512 FFT
bins). The spectrum dimension is 513 (1024 FFT bins) when
training filter banks with 128 channels. Correspondingly, the
number of nodes in the first hidden layer were also set as
20 and 128.
Fig. 4 shows the learned filter banks and their corre-
sponding manually designed shape restriction filter banks.
The trained filter banks include the DNN-triangle filter
bank (DNN-TFB), the DNN-rectangle filter bank (DNN-
RFB), the DNN-Gammatone filter bank (DNN-GFB) and
1The source codes and training config files of FBNN can be downloaded
at http://kom.aau.dk/~zt/fbnn.zip
the DNN-inverted Gammatone filter bank (DNN-IGFB). The
flexible shapes that learned filters have in different frequency
bands give more modeling power and this can potentially
capture the difference between human and spoofed speech
effectively. By observing learned filter banks, we can find
that the learned filters have higher amplitudes in the high
frequency region and lower amplitudes in the low frequency
region (Fig. 4(f), 4(h), 4(l)), which highlights the more impor-
tant of the high frequency region and inline with the finding
in paper [36].
C. CLASSIFIER
In designing the classifier, we train two separatedGMMswith
512 mixtures to model natural and spoofed speech, respec-
tively. Log likelihood ratio is used as criterion of assessment,
which is defined as:
ML (X) =
1
T
T∑
i=1
{
logP(Xi|λhuman)− logP(Xi|λspoof)
}
, (8)
where X denotes feature vectors with T frames, λhuman and
λspoof are the GMM parameters of human and spoof model,
respectively.
TABLE 2. Description of manually designed Cep features and DNN-FBCC
features used in the experiments.
D. COMPARISON WITH MANUALLY
DESIGNED Cep FEATURES
We compare the spoofing detection performance between
manually designed Cep features and DNN-FBCC features,
as shown in Table 2. Manually designed Cep features
include TFCC1/TFCC2 (linear frequency triangle filter bank
cepstral coefficients), RFCC1/RFCC2 (linear frequency rect-
angle filter bank cepstral coefficients), GFCC (ERB space
Gammatone filter bank cepstral coefficients) and IGFCC
(inverted ERB space Gammatone filter bank cepstral coef-
ficients), which are generated, respectively, by TFB, RFB,
GFB, and IGFB as described in Section III-B. DNN-FBCC
features include DNN-TFCC1/DNN-TFCC2, DNN-RFCC1/
DNN-RFCC2, DNN-GFCC and DNN-IGFCC which are
generated by learned filter banks DNN-TFB, DNN-RFB,
DNN-GFB, and DNN-IGFB, respectively. Among the
DNN-FBCC, TFCC1, DNN-TFCC1, RFCC1, DNN-RFCC1
are generated by 20-channel filter banks and other features
are generated by 128-channel filter banks. The number of
4782 VOLUME 5, 2017
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FIGURE 4. Filter banks used for shape restriction and corresponding learned filter banks. (a) TFB with 20 channels. (b) DNN-TFB with 20 channels.
(c) RFB with 20 channels. (d) DNN-RFB with 20 channels. (e) TFB with 128 channels. (f) DNN-TFB with 128 channels. (g) RFB with 128 channels.
(h) DNN-RFB with 128 channels. (i) GFB with 128 channels. (j) DNN-GFB with 128 channels. (k) IGFB with 128 channels. (l) DNN-IGFB with
128 channels.
coefficients M of all the features are set as 20 (including the
0’th coefficient).
Inspired by the work in [16], we use 1 and 12 (first-
and second-order frame-to-frame difference) coefficients to
train the GMM-ML classifier. The equal error rate (EER)
is used for measuring spoofing detection performance. The
average EERs of different spoofing features on development
and evaluation sets are shown in TABLE 3.
Among the manually designed Cep features, GFCC(112)
generated by the filter bank with large spacing in the high-
frequency region performs worst.
TFCC2(112), RFCC2(112) and IGFCC(112) perform
better than TFCC1(112) and RFCC1(112) which means
increasing the number of filter bank channels can extract
more effective discriminative information for spoofing
detection.
The six learned DNN-FBCC features outperform the cor-
responding manually designed Cep features. DNN-GFCC
still works worst, which means the filter banks with wider
bandwidth on the high frequency region are not suitable for
the spoofing detection task.
DNN-RFCC1(112) generated by 20 channels DNN-RFB
performs best on detecting known attacks, but works worse
on unknown spoofing attacks. This indicates that the shape
restrictions applied on FBNN affect the performance of
spoofing detection. When a rectangle filter is selected
(Fig. 4(c)), there are no special shape restrictions on the
learned filters, and this makes the learned DNN-RFB over-
fit the trained/known attacks.
With the increase of filter bank channels and reduction
of bandwidth of each filters, the shape restriction of RFB
is further increased. As shown in Fig. 4(e)-4(h), shape
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TABLE 3. Accuracies (Avg.EER in %) of different Cep features on the development and evaluation set.
restrictions of 128-channel TFB and RFB tend to be similar,
which causes the learned filter banks, DNN-TFB and DNN-
RFB, with 128 channels, also having the similar shapes.
The spoofing detection performance of DNN-RFCC2(112)
derived from 128-channel DNN-RFB is close to that of DNN-
TFCC2(112) generated by 128-channel DNN-TFB. The
over fitting problem of DNN-RFB is partially overcome by
reducing the bandwidth of each filters.
When a Gammatone filter is chosen (IGFB, Fig.4(k)),
the shape restriction can make the performance of DNN-
IGFCC(112) better than the corresponding IGFCC(112)
on both known and unknown attacks. In general, among all
the investigated Cep features, DNN-IGFCC(112), generated
by the learned filter bankwhich has denser spacing in the high
frequency region and has the Gammatone shape restriction,
performs best on ASVspoof 2015 data base and gets the best
average accuracy, overall.
In summary, the learned filter banks produced by FBNN
using suitable band limiting and shape restrictions can
improve the spoofing detection accuracy over the existing
manually designed filter banks by learning flexible and effec-
tive filters. DNN-FBCC, especially DNN-IGFCC(112), can
largely in- crease the detection accuracy on unknown spoof-
ing attacks.
E. COMPARISON WITH SOME OTHER
DATA DRIVEN FEATURES
In this subsection we compare the performance of the
DNN-IGFCC(112) feature with some other data driven fea-
tures on spoofing detection tasks. All studied features are pre-
processed with the same method described in Section III-A.
The performance of studied features are evaluated using
the GMM based spoofing detection model described in
Section III-C. The neural networks used in this paper are all
built and trained by CNTK with the same configuration used
in FBNN training, in terms of training labels, loss function,
learning rate, and learning epochs.
DNN-FBCC features are extracted by a learned filterbank
with band-limiting and shape restrictions. In order to study
the effect of these restrictions, we firstly investigate perfor-
mance of the un-restricted filterbank (u-FB) feature extracted
by learned filter banks without restrictions (Fig. 2(b)).
We use power spectrum features with 513 dimensions
(1024 FFT bins) as input and set the size ofWfb as 513×128.
In the training process we ignore equation (2) and do not
apply any restrictions on Wfb.
Without non-negative restriction, cepstral analysis can not
be applied on the learned u-FB feature. As DCT operation in
cepstral analysis can be considered as a whitening method,
in order to have fair quantitative comparison, we use princi-
pal component analysis (PCA) to whiten u-FB features and
reduce the dimension from 128 to 20.
u-FB-PCA (112) features with 40 dimensions are used
for GMM model training. The performance of u-FB-PCA
(112) is shown in the third row of TABLE 4. It is very clearly
shown that without restrictions the learned u-FB feature is not
suitable for spoofing detection task.
TABLE 4. Accuracies (Avg.EER in %) of DNN-IGFCC(112) and some other
data driven features on the evaluation set.
Then we compare the DNN-FBCC feature with three dif-
ferent data driven features widely used in speaker verification
and speech recognition task.
LDA filter bank feature (LDA-FB) [25] is generated by
a 20 channels LDA filter bank which is learned by power
spectrum feature with 257 dimensions.
MFCC bottle neck feature (MFCC-BN) [22] is produced
by the middle hidden layer of a five-hidden-layer DNN, and
the nodes number of hidden layers are set as 2048, 2048, 60,
2048 and 2048, respectively. The DNN is trained by a block
of 11 frames of 60 MFCC (static+112) features.
The log-normalized learned mel-scale filter bank feature
(l-LMFB) is generated by a neural network introduced in [26]
which also use the power spectrum with 257 dimension as
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input and the log-normalized output of middle hidden layer
is used as features. l-LMFB also belongs to learned filter bank
features and we set the channel number of learned mel-scale
filter bank as 20.
Static and dynamic (112) features are used for spoof-
ing detection model training, respectively. The experimental
results in TABLE 4 show that among these three kinds of
features, the simple data driven filter bank feature LDA-FB
is not suitable for the spoofing detection task. While, MFCC-
BN and l-LMFB generated from complex neural networks
workmuch better. Especially, l-LMFBwhich is also extracted
by a filter-bank learning method perform best. However,
as there are no shape and amplitude restrictions applied
on the learned filter banks, l-LMFB performs worse than
DNN-IGFCC, especially on unknown spoofing detection.
We also compare DNN-IGFCC(112) with some DNN
based bottle neck (BN) features used for spoofing detec-
tion tasks. The published results show that dynamic fea-
tures are more useful for spoofing detection. Following the
suggestion in paper [21], we use four dynamic features
to generate DNN-BN feature, including dynamic mel-scale
filter bank (DFB) feature, dynamic Mel-frequency cepstral
coefficients (DMCC), dynamic product spectrum-based cep-
stral coefficients (DPSCC) and dynamic linear predication
cepstral coefficients (DLPCC). DFB, DMCC and DPSCC are
extracted by a mel-scale filter bank with 20 channels and the
coefficient numbers of these four features are set as 20.
The feature extraction DNN has five sigmoid hidden layers
with node numbers being 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000 and 64,
respectively. The output of the fifth layer is used as the
DNN-BN feature. The input layer consists of a block of
15 successive dynamic (112) features, so the dimension
of the input layer is 40 × 15 = 600. The softmax output
layer also have five nodes, which is the same as the setting
of FBNN. All the learned features are also whitened by the
PCA method. From the experimental results in TABLE 4,
we can observe that the DPSCC-BN feature, which includes
both amplitude-frequency and phase information, gives the
best performance [40]. It works a little better than DNN-
IGFCC(112) on known spoofing attacks but perform worse
on unknown attacks because of the over-fitting problem.
We also use the same DPSCC features to train a long short
term memory (LSTM) networks based BN feature extractor
which includes two LSTM layers with 1000 nodes and a full
connection sigmoid hidden layer with 64 nodes. The PCA
whitened DPSCC-LSTM-BN feature with dimension 64 still
perform worse than the DNN-IGFCC(112) feature.
Generally speaking, DNN-FBCC features, especially
DNN-IGFCC(112), which are generated by learned restric-
tive filter banks, perform better on the spoofing detection
tasks than the other data driven features.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORKS
In this paper, we introduced a filter bank neural network
with two hidden layers for spoofing detection. During train-
ing, a non-negative restriction function and a band-limiting
mask matrix were applied on the weight matrix between the
input layer and the first hidden layer. These restrictions made
the learned weight matrix non-negative, band-limited, shape
restriction and ordered by frequency. The weight matrix can
be used as a filter bank for cepstral analysis. Experimental
results show that cepstral coefficients (Cep) features pro-
duced by the learned filter banks were able to distinguish
the natural and synthetic speech more precisely and robustly
than the manually designed Cep features and general DNN
features. Recently, some new speech synthesis technologies
based on neural networks has been published [41], it encour-
age us to develop more robust feature to defence the spoofing
attacks.
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